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INTRODUCTION
The brief that Plaintiff/Appellee, Oletta Cummings, has
submitted to this Court focuses intently on the fact that
Defendant/Appellant, Clyde Kay Cummings, has not referred this
Court to his deposition testimony in marshalling the evidence.
Plaintiff fails to point out, however, that nowhere in the
trial court record is there any indication whatsoever that the
depositions of Mr. Cummings were ever filed with the court.

The

depositions are not part of the trial court's record and there is
no evidence of any pleading, transmittal letter, or transcribed
proceeding demonstrating that the depositions were filed with the
trial court.
Under the controlling precedent of this Court, the failure
to file depositions with the trial court, even if formally
published, precludes their consideration on appeal. Accordingly,
Mr. Cummings has no burden to marshal information that is not
part of the record before this Court as it is not evidence which
the trial court considered.
Therefore, the only evidence presented to the trial court
and reviewable by this Court is the transcript of the evidentiary
hearing before Judge Iwasaki.

Defendant Cummings has met his

burden to marshal the evidence with respect to the evidence in
the trial court record and thoroughly discussed and demonstrated
in his initial brief the wholly inadequate basis for the court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
s:\jfw\84940
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Given the failure of Plaintiff to file the depositions with
the trial court and Defendant's sufficient and detailed
marshalling of the evidence to this Court,i7 Defendant Cummings
urges this Court to decide his appeal without oral argument.
ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Cummings Has Met His Burden to Marshal the Evidence and
Has No Duty to Marshal Information Not Contained in the
Trial Court'a Record
A.

Mr. Cummings7 Depositions Are Not Part of the Record,
Are Not Evidence, and Cannot Be Considered on Appeal.

Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Cummings has failed to marshal
all the evidence "from the complete record" in support of the
Findings of Fact.

She argues that the "complete record" includes

the deposition testimony of Mr. Cummings.

Plaintiff goes so far

as to attach as addenda to her brief apparently the entire
transcripts of three different deposition sessions of Mr.
Cummings.

Plaintiff's claims, however, are unsupported by any

citation to authority.

Her attempt to improperly supplement the

record before this Court should not be allowed.
17

Defendant Cummings' argument regarding Plaintiff's failure to
file the depositions is not merely a legalistic attempt to prevail
based on technicalities. The cites to Mr. Cummings' deposition
testimony that Plaintiff has attempted to add to the record by
providing them in her brief on appeal, even if true, are
insufficient to revive the already infirm and wholly inadequate
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
It is also noteworthy that apart from the cites in Plaintiff's
brief to her addenda which contain the depositions, she failed to
cite to the deposition testimony at the evidentiary hearing held
before Judge Iwasaki, at which time Plaintiff had the unrestricted
opportunity to proffer as evidence and cite to Mr. Cummings'
deposition testimony.
S:\Dfw\84940
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This Court has recognized that unless a deposition is filed
with the court, even if it was formally published, it cannot be
reviewed on appeal.

Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 73 9 P.2d

634, 641 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J., concurring) ("But alas, we
are unable to determine from the record that the depositions were
even filed, and for failure of the record to show us otherwise
respondents have no one to blame but themselves.") (emphasis
added); accord Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d
201, 206 n.3 (Utah App. 1990) ("After reviewing the record, we
find that no depositions were filed with the district court.

In

resolving an appeal, an appellate court may not consider
depositions which have not been filed with the district court.");
see also Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P.2d 146 (Utah 1962) (noting
that court could not consider depositions in record that were
still in sealed envelopes because court "must assume that it was
not considered by the lower court").
The trial court's record, which has been compiled and
indexed by the district court clerk's office, does not contain
the transcripts of Mr. Cummings' deposition testimony.^

The

clerk's office has no record of any depositions ever being filed

11

Plaintiff's brief fails to cite to the indexed trial court
record, as required by Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
S:\3fw\84940
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in this matter.-7

The evidentiary hearing held before Judge

Iwasaki makes no reference to any of Mr. Cummings' deposition
testimony and Plaintiff offered none of that testimony at the
evidentiary hearing to support the Findings of Fact.

Hence, the

deposition testimony of Mr. Cummings is not a part of the record
on appeal, was not evidence presented for the trial court's
review, and cannot now be considered on appeal.
B.

Mr. Cummings Has No Duty Under Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure to Have Included in the
Record the Depositions that Plaintiff Failed to File
With the Court

Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Cummings has somehow been
derelict in his duty under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure because the depositions of Mr. Cummings are not part of
the record.
reasons.

Her position is insupportable for at least two

First, Mr. Cummings has no duty to create the record

for Plaintiff.

Her failure to file the depositions is not

something that Mr. Cummings has an obligation to correct.

As

this Court has recently noted, parties who fail to file the
depositions with the trial court and to make the record so
indicate "have no one to blame but themselves."

Conder, 739 P.2d

at 641 (Orme, J., concurring).

-; Although Plaintiff makes the self-serving, unsupported, footnote
statement that the depositions were left with the trial court at
the close of the evidentiary hearing, the transcript of that
hearing makes no mention of any depositions being filed and there
is absolutely no indication whatsoever in the record that the
depositions were ever filed. Appellee's Brief at 28 n.4.
S:\3fw\84940

-4-

Second, Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure clearly provides that Mr. Cummings has an obligation to
provide a "transcript of all evidence relevant to [the] finding
or conclusion" challenged on appeal.
Mr. Cummings did this.

Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).

He formally requested that Judge

Iwasaki's court reporter transcribe the evidentiary hearing held
before Judge Iwasaki so that this Court could review the receipt
of evidence and the proceedings A1

This evidence, and none

else, is the relevant evidence for this Court's consideration.
Rule 11(e)(2) does not, however, impose on Mr. Cummings the
duty to add documents to the trial court's record that were never
filed with the court and never introduced as evidence before the
judge.

The mere publication of deposition testimony does not

make them evidence.
concurring).

Conder, 739 P.2d at 641 (Orme, J.,

Thus, Mr. Cummings had, and continues to have, no

duty to include his deposition transcripts in the record-7 nor

i7

Mr. Cummings also requested the court reporter to transcribe all
other hearings before Judge Iwasaki. These transcriptions are part
of the record. However, except for the March 6, 1995 evidentiary
hearing, the other proceedings did not involve the receipt of
evidence.

-7 As the appellate rules correctly point out, it is the clerk of
the court who is given the task of compiling the record and it is
appellant's counsel who is given the duty of insuring that the
relevant portions of the record make it to the court of appeals.
Neither of these individuals has a duty to add to the record any
documents that Plaintiff has failed to file with the court. Utah
R. App. P 11(b), (e).
s:\jfw\84940
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does Mr. Cummings have a duty to marshal his deposition testimony
as evidence.
C.

The Findings of Fact Are Not Evidence

Repeatedly in her brief, Mrs. Cummings cites the Findings of
Fact as support for what the court did.

For example, Plaintiff

asserts that the trial court did review Mr. Posey's report,
because the Findings of Fact state he did.
31-32.

Brief

of Appellee

at

Plaintiff also states that the corporation did not follow

corporate formalities, because the Findings of Fact state it did
not. Id.

at 42.

The Findings of Fact, however, are not evidence of what
happened.

Rather, the Findings of Fact must be supported by, and

congruent with, the evidence presented to and considered by the
trial court.

Thus, to cite the Findings of Fact as evidentiary

support for the trial court's actions and decision is circular
and impermissible.-7
The focus of this appeal is not on what the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law state; rather, the focus is on whether the
evidence presented to the trial court supports those Findings and

-7 In this case, counsel for Plaintiff had carte blanche to prepare
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Mr. Cummings had
been removed from the proceedings by default. In fact, counsel for
Plaintiff came to the evidentiary hearing with the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law already drafted and ready for submission to
the trial court. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Before Judge
Iwasaki on March 6. 1995 at 12:21-25 to 13:1-4.
S:\jfw\84940
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Conclusions .2/ Mr. Cummings asserts that they are wholly
unsupported or inadequate as the only evidence presented to the
trial court, and the only evidence before this Court on appeal,
is the transcript of the brief and incomplete evidentiary hearing
held before Judge Iwasaki.
II.

Plaintiff's Brief Contains Factual Errors
A,

Mr. Cummings Was Not Allowed to Participate in the
Evidentiary Hearing

Plaintiff asserts throughout her brief that Mr. Cummings
failed to participate, by his own choice, in the evidentiary
hearing, specifically, that he failed to call the court appointed
independent expert, Mr. Posey, to testify and failed to introduce
Mr. Posey's reports as evidence to the Court.
This argument is unsupported, however, by the record.

A

review of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on March
6, 1995 before Judge Iwasaki clearly demonstrates that Mr.

11

Plaintiff states in her brief that Addendum A of Mr. Cummings
brief should be stricken because it is a continuation of his
argument and thus exceeds the allowable page limit. Addendum A to
Mr. Cummings' brief is simply a verbatim restatement of the trial
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As Mr. Cummings
is challenging the entire Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
inclusion of this information in the addendum is suggested and
permissible pursuant to Rule 24(a) (11) (C) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
To aid the Court in its review of these Findings and
Conclusions, Mr. Cummings has included cites to the transcript of
the evidentiary hearing that support the Findings and Conclusions.
There is, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, no argument in
Addendum A. Furthermore, the cites to the record comprise no more
than 3-4 pages of material and Mr. Cummings had at least that much
additional space in his brief before exceeding the page limit.
S:\jfw\84940
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Cummings was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses or proffer
evidence for the court's consideration.

Under Utah law, a

defaulted party should be allowed to at least conduct these
minimal functions to ensure the fairness of the proceedings.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 964 n.12 (Utah
App. 1989) (noting that "majority of jurisdictions considering
the procedural rights of a defaulting party have held that the
defaulting party is entitled to cross-examine witnesses and
present mitigating evidence").
Plaintiff's argument also glosses over the fact that the
trial court failed to consider the court-appointed expert's
report and relied, instead, on the subjective, biased, and selfserving testimony of Mrs. Cummings. Accordingly, it was clear
error for the trial court to exclude Mr. Cummings from
participating in the evidentiary hearing.
B.

The Building Is A Corporate Asset

Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the "building in which
the business is conducted . . . has never been a corporate asset
and was titled in the parties' individual names all through the
divorce proceedings."

Brief of Appellee at 44.

This statement, if left unexplained, would mislead the
Court.

In 1984, Mr. Cummings successfully arranged for Salt Lake

County to issue Industrial Revenue Bonds, the proceeds of which
were used to construct the building out of which the candy
business is operated.
S:\jfw\84940
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incorporate his business at that time as part of the transaction.
The corporation, not Mr. and Mrs. Cummings, signed the loan
agreement to repay to the County the loan proceeds generated by
the industrial revenue bonds. While true that Mr. and Mrs.
Cummings owned the land prior to the construction of the
building, they subordinated their interest in the property, as
part of the transaction, to First Security Bank, as Trustee, to
be held as collateral and security for the loan agreement.
Recorded documents evidence these facts.
Thus, the trial court improperly awarded corporate assets
and obligations when it awarded ownership of the building and
land outright to Mrs. Cummings and ordered Mr. Cummings to pay
the loan secured by the land and building.
III. Default Was Not Appropriate
In Plaintiff's brief, she cites the case of Marshall v.
Marshall, 915 P.2d 509 (Utah App. 1996) as support for her
argument that the trial court's decision to default Mr. Cummings
was appropriate.
The facts of Marshall, however, are inapposite to the facts
of this case.

In Marshall, the husband intentionally withheld

information from the court regarding his assets and attempted to
hide those assets so that the court could not reach them for
inclusion in the marital estate.

This led to the appellate

court's statement that the judicial system is not to be

s \}fw\84940
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manipulated by one who actively and aggressively misleads the
court and opposing party.
In the instant case, however, Judge Iwasaki noted in open
court that Mr. Cummings had "substantially complied" with the
court's orders.-7 Mr. Cummings has never tried to shield or
hide assets of the marital estate.

He did, for various reasons,

respond late to some of Plaintiff's discovery requests.
Cummings has always responded.

But Mr.

Plaintiff's complaints to the

court regarding Mr. Cummings' noncompliance were generally lodged
only after Plaintiff deemed Mr. Cummings' initial responses
insufficient.
In any event, to strike Mr. Cummings' Answer after 2 1/2
years of proceedings was extremely harsh.

As noted by the

Marshall court,
"The striking of pleadings, entering of default, and
rendering of judgment against a disobedient party are the most
severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a
nonresponding party." Because of the severity of this type of
sanction, "the trial court's range of discretion is more narrow
than when the court is imposing less severe sanctions."
Marshall, 915 P.2d at 515 (emphasis added)(quoting Utah Dep't of
Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 7 & 8 (Utah 1995)).
court had several, less severe, options before it.

The trial

It could have

-7 On a related point, all of the orders attached as addenda to
Appellee's Brief are unsigned copies rather than copies from the
indexed record of the orders signed by the court.
While the
unsigned orders are presumably the same as the signed copies, it
nonetheless is an added inconvenience to both the Court and
Defendant who must compare the unsigned copies with the signed
copies to ensure their accuracy.
S \;jfw\84940
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restricted Mr. Cummings' ability to enter evidence on those
topics about which he had not responded to the court's
satisfaction or it could have found him in contempt of court.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b).

It did neither.

Rather than using

one of these less drastic and permanent measures, the court chose
the most severe measure--default.
The court chose default despite the fact that the court
appointed expert's report had been received almost seven months
prior to the entry of default.-7

This report, along with the

knowledge obtained by the court appointed expert, provided enough

11

Mrs. Cummings erroneously indicates to the Court that the
appraisal report of Mr. Posey was not presented to the trial court
until the time of the evidentiary hearing in March 1996. Plaintiff
has obviously not reviewed the trial court's indexed record which
contains the original envelope, still sealed by order of the court,
in which Mr. Posey's appraisal and report was sent to the trial
court. That envelope has a postmark date of September 1, 1994 and
a stamp from the district court dated September 7, 1994. Thus, the
trial court clearly had this relevant and critical piece of
information for almost seven months prior to the entry of Mr.
Cummings' default.
As to the second report filed by Mr. Posey, Plaintiff alleges
that this report was originally filed in the fall of 1994 but was
defective. There is no evidence in the record of any report by Mr.
Posey being filed with the court in the fall of 1994 other than the

appraisal

referenced

above.

If

true,

it obviously

supports

Mr.

Cummings' position that he was attempting to comply with the trial
court's orders.
In any event, the second report filed by Mr. Posey that is
still sealed in the court's record is accompanied by a cover letter
from Mr. Spafford's office dated February 28, 1995, prior to the
evidentiary hearing. That letter indicates that Mr. Posey's report
covers the period from September 1, 1992 to December 31, 1994.
Given the coverage of this report, it is unlikely that it was filed
in the fall of 1994.
Furthermore, the letter states that it
accompanies a sealed envelope containing Mr. Posey's report and is
being submitte_d to the court by Mr. Cummings' attorneys.
S:\jfw\84940
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objective and detailed information that the court could have
fairly divided the marital estate, even though Mr. Cummings had
not fully complied with all of the outstanding discovery
requests.

Consequently, the trial court's decision to strike Mr.

Cummings' Answer and enter his default was an abuse of the narrow
discretion afforded to trial courts when entering default
judgments.

See Marshall, 915 P.2d at 515.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and presented in Appellant's
initial brief, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
set aside the default entered by the trial court and remand the
case to be tried on its merits.

Furthermore, even if this Court

declines to set aside the default, Appellant respectfully
requests that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be
remanded for the taking of further evidence by the trial court,
that Mr. Cummings be allowed to participate in those proceedings,
and that the trial court be required to review and use the court
appointed expert's reports and testimony in dividing the marital
estate.

S:\jfw\84940

Finally, Defendant requests that this Court decide the
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merits of his appeal without oral argument
DATED this

day of August, 1996.

M. Byron Fisner
James F. Wood
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellant
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